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Abstract
When the FN was founded in the early 1970s it was widely irrelevant. However, over the past
three decades, the party has managed to enter into and reshape mainstream French politics. In
the 1980s, economic, social, and political transformations aided the FN in their popularization.
This paper looks at how similar transformations in the 21st century have enabled this neonationalist party to gain such unprecedented electoral success. More precisely, this paper looks
at how these factors, identified as the 2008-2009 global economic crisis, changing immigration
trends, and the presidencies of Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande, have all interacted and
intersected to create a favorable climate for the rise of the FN by promoting fear and a sense of
crisis.
Keywords: Front National, neo-nationalism, France
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Introduction
Emanuel Macron’s victory over Marine Le Pen in the 2017 presidential election was
perceived as a symbolic rejection, not just of Le Pen’s party, the Front National (FN), but also
of a larger, growing movement of nationalist resistance to globalization that had been gaining
popularity, known as neo-nationalism. The 2017 election was thought to have demonstrated
that France was willing to try new ‘alternatives’ to traditional political parties (i.e. Macron’s
centrist political platform), rather than accepting the exclusionary neo-nationalist platform
of the FN. However, Le Pen’s loss did not mean that French voters had renounced the FN,
nor did it symbolize a much larger rejection of neo-nationalism around the world. Le Pen’s
electoral results were historic for the party, as approximately 11 million French people voted
for her in the second round, which were the most votes the FN had ever received. Rather than
signifying the demise of the Front National, this election demonstrated that the party has
become a serious political force in France.
Overall, this paper seeks to understand the nature of neo-nationalist parties by
exploring both why the Front National has gained popularity in the 2010s and the origins of
the party’s power and support. This paper argues that just as economic, social, and political
transformations aided the FN’s popularization in the 1980s, similar transformations have
taken place in the 21st century that have aided the party’s resurgence. The consequences of the
2008-2009 economic recession, changing immigration trends, and the presidencies of Nicolas
Sarkozy and François Hollande have interacted with one another to benefit the Front National.
Collectively, these transformations have heightened fears and promoted the idea that France
is in a state of crisis, legitimizing the message of the FN and demonstrating how the FN draws
power from instability, fear, and crisis.

Historical Context: The Rise and Resurgence of the Front
National
When Jean-Maire Le Pen founded the Front National in 1972, the party was not able to
gain much support. The FN strove to present itself as a right-wing populist, anti-communist,
and xenophobic movement advocating for the shrinkage of the public sector, lessening of
state intervention, and drastic immigration restrictions (Davies, 1999). However, their political
platform elicited no significant electoral response for nearly a decade, as it was seen as an
extremist party that did not reflect the concerns of the public or the political agenda in France
at the time.
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The initial rise of the Front National took place during the 1980s and is linked to specific
social, economic, and political transformations that occurred in France during this period.
These transformations made the political platform of the FN more appealing as it brought
some of the party’s main issues to the forefront of the political agenda, which the FN then
exploited in order to legitimize and develop its platform (Bréchon & Mitra, 1992). First, the
country experienced an economic crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which resulted in
rising unemployment and diminished economic growth. Although President Mitterand sought
to implement neo-Keynesian economic policy to counteract economic turmoil, unemployment
only increased, leaving many voters unhappy with the economic state of France (Stockemer,
2017). Second, immigration became a more pertinent issue in France due to Mitterrand’s
easing of immigration policy and an increase in immigrants from North Africa (Stockemer,
2017). These demographic changes began raising fears about increased crime rates in social
housing projects (Stockemer, 2017). Lastly, in 1985 President Mitterrand changed the French
electoral system from a plurality voting system to a party-list proportional representation
system (Miller, 1986). This change made it easier for smaller parties like the FN to win seats in
legislative bodies, explaining the party’s electoral success in the 1986 legislative election.
The FN exploited the economic crisis, the changing economy, electoral system, and
immigration trends in the 1980s by reshaping their political platform to center on immigration
and security (Stockemer, 2017). The party used these changes within France in order to
advance xenophobic and authoritarian sentiments in French politics, purporting that there
was a connection between the increase in non-European immigrants and the rise of crime
and unemployment in France. Additionally, Le Pen began upholding a more populist
message that could attract a wider audience and address the growing lack of confidence in
the established political system’s ability to address key voter issues (Stockemer, 2017). The FN
used populism both as a means to differentiate itself from mainstream parties and to present
itself as the alternative to the French political system (Stockemer, 2017). Their new language
stressed a discourse promoting “exclusionary conceptions of community” that countered
multiculturalism and inclusion (Stockemer, 2017, p. 15). Le Pen emphasized the idea that
power needed to be returned to the French people and that populist free-market capitalism
was the best way to achieve this.
The FN’s ability to use these economic, social, and political transformations to
its advantage helped the party achieve its first electoral successes. In the 1984 European
Parliament elections, the FN won 11% of the votes, giving them 10 seats in the European
Parliament (France Politique, 2015). Two years later in 1986, the FN won 35 seats in the
Assemblée Nationale (France Politique, 2015). In 1988, the party and Jean-Marie Le Pen won
14.38% of the vote in the presidential election (France Politique, 2015).
During the 1990s, globalization became an important issue in French national politics,
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in part a result of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union and
eventually led to the creation of the Euro. In response to the treaty, the FN began transitioning
towards economic protectionism and criticizing neo-liberalism, arguing that the government’s
commitment to global free trade was the reason the economy was declining (Bastow,
1997). Opposition to globalization was incorporated into the party’s populist rhetoric by
“[modifying] its divisive ‘us/them’ discourse to include new political “enemies” such as elites
from the European Union and other supranational organizations” (Stockemer, 2017, p. 20).
This seemed to further their popularity, as in 1993 the party won 12.7% of the votes in the
parliamentary election and 14.9% five years later (Norsk Senter for Forskningdata, n.d.). In
1995, Le Pen captured 15% of the votes in the presidential election, a record percentage for the
party at the time (Norsk Senter for Forskningdata, n.d).
Through the 1980s and 1990s, the FN integrated its economic and political concerns
into the French mainstream political agenda, forcing other political parties to engage with
these topics (Davies, 1999). During this time many parties began appropriating elements
of Le Pen’s anti-immigration rhetoric as a strategy to advance their own political agendas.
However, this worked to the FN’s advantage, giving credibility to its rhetoric (Stockemer,
2017). The unforeseen progression of the FN into mainstream politics became visible in the
2002 presidential election, during which Le Pen became the first leader of a nationalist party
to qualify for the second round of voting (Stockemer, 2017). However, this sparked massive
anti-FN mobilization. The defeated PS candidate Lionel Jospin called for voters to unite,
regardless of political affiliations, and vote for Jacques Chirac in order to block Le Pen from
winning (Stockemer, 2017). French media outlets largely denounced the FN as a nationalist
threat, tarnishing the credibility of the party as well as shrinking its electorate. This scandal,
accompanied by racist and anti-Semitic comments from Le Pen and internal turmoil within the
party, caused long-term damage to the FN and resulted in the party’s subsequent alienation
by the French public. The loss of the FN’s electorate is exemplified by Jean-Marie Le Pen’s
performance in the 2007 presidential election, as he did not receive enough votes to qualify for
the second round.
However, since Marine Le Pen took her father’s place as leader of the FN in 2011, the
party has experienced a revival. After becoming president, Le Pen launched a dédiabolisation
(“de-demonization”) campaign as a strategy to reverse the French public’s negative perception
of the party (Beardsley, 2017). This has included expelling controversial members, softening
aspects of the party’s political agenda, as well as altering the rhetoric of the FN (Stockemer
& Barisione, 2017). Marine Le Pen reshaped the party’s discourse to minimize its infamous
xenophobic messages and replace it with more “respectful” populist rhetoric. While the party
under Jean-Marie Le Pen was also characterized as populist, it was the radical element that
prevailed, typically manifesting in racist, sexist, and anti-Semitic comments (Stockemer &
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Barisione, 2017). Moving away from these radical elements, Marine Le Pen aimed to present
the FN as a moderate party, as exemplified by her recent move to change the name of the party
from le Front National to le Rassemblement National. However, her strategy was more indicative
of a ploy to distance and disassociate the party from its fascist roots, rather than an actual
change in the party’s ideology. Rassemblement (“gathering” or “rally”) has historically been
affiliated with traditional right parties, while Front has been associated with radical parties on
either side of the political spectrum.
There are very few ideological differences between the “old” FN of Jean-Marie Le
Pen and the “new” FN of Marine Le Pen. The Front National continues to focus on the
concepts of nation and identity, with a neo-nationalist ideology centered on preserving
French national identity, society, and culture (Davies, 1999). The FN operates as the selfproclaimed “protector” of France, portraying the French nation as weak and vulnerable to
the consequences of globalization and transnational issues like immigration, which threaten
the state and therefore the French identity (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). It is evident that
the central basis for the FN, as with other neo-nationalist parties, is not an adherence to
rightist or the leftist beliefs. Rather, its basis is rooted in promoting and defending the nation
and national identity; thus, directly informing its political, economic, and social agendas.
Due to this, the FN’s platform tends to overlap with both right-wing and left-wing values.
While the FN shares common ideological characteristics with the right, such as an emphasis
on traditional values and anti-immigration rhetoric, the party’s economic ideology departs
from typical right-wing views. Additionally, the FN shares the far-left’s anti-establishment
populism, a disdain for supranational organizations, and support for social welfare programs.
However, they remain distinct from left-leaning parties due to their nationalist desire to
protect and increase the benefits of ethno-nationals while simultaneously cutting benefits for
foreigners (Eger & Valdez, 2015).
Due to the changing global context and trends, neo-nationalist parties typically have
to adjust how they promote their political agenda in order to remain popular, as explicitly
exclusionary, racist, or xenophobic rhetoric is becoming more unacceptable (Banks & Marcus,
2006). In this way, Le Pen’s emphasis on reshaping the FN’s discourse can be perceived as an
attempt to remain in mainstream politics by dismissing the party’s racist origins, concealing
the fact that the party maintains the same ideology, and using these tactics to appeal to a
wider audience. However, this shift in discourse alone cannot explain the party’s recent
popularity. Rather, the FN’s re-emergence in French politics echoes its initial rise in the 1980s.
The economic, social, and political transformations that enabled the FN to first come to power
in the 1980s mirror the global economic crisis of 2008-2009, changing immigration trends,
as well as the presidencies of Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande. These contemporary
transformations have collectively strengthened the rise of the FN in the 21st by causing
instability and provoking fear.
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Factors that have Contributed to the Rise of the Front
National in the 21st Century
Economic: Global Crisis of 2008-2009
Economic instability is one of the most commonly cited contributing factors to the rise
of the FN, as the party tends to gain more votes during periods of high unemployment and
low economic growth. According to a study conducted by Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick,
and Christoph Trebesch (2015), far-right parties are the largest beneficiaries of economic
crises. According to their research, “in general, voting for far-right parties increases from
about 6% to about 10% following a financial crisis” (Funke, Schularick, & Trebesch, 2015, p.
14). In recent years, neo-nationalist and right-wing populist parties have benefited more from
economic instability than traditional extreme right parties, having more pronounced spikes
in electoral gains. As a result of these voting trends, the strengthening of opposition forces
increases fragmentation within national political systems, resulting in a weaker and less
effective government (Funke et al., 2015). These developments can hinder crisis resolution due
to political polarization, therefore slowing down a country’s economic recovery.
Since the 2008-2009 global recession, France’s inconstant economic state mirrors the
economic conditions that are conducive to the rise of neo-nationalist parties. France’s GDP has
continuously fluctuated since 2009, yet it has not returned to its peak level in 2008. In 2015,
GDP reached its lowest point since the beginning of the recession, leveling at $2.438 trillion
(World Bank, n.d.). However, since this point, France’s GDP has been slowly increasing,
reaching $2.583 trillion in 2017 (World Bank, n.d.). France’s total unemployment rate followed
a similar pattern, gradually rising until reaching 10.36% in 2015, France’s highest rate since
1999 (World Bank, 2018). After peaking in 2015, France’s rate of unemployment has been
slowly declining, reaching 8.812% in 2018 (World Bank, 2018).
Yet it is during this period of economic instability in France that the Front National
made significant gains in their electoral success. The party experienced an approximate
10% vote increase in both departmental and legislative elections between the 2007-2008
and 2011-2012 elections. In the 2012 presidential election, Le Pen almost doubled her vote
share compared to her father’s 2007 election results (Norsk Senter for Forskningdata, n.d.).
Furthermore, in the 2009 European Parliament election, the party only won 6.34% of the vote,
obtaining only four seats in the parliament and placing sixth nationally. Yet, in 2014, the FN
won the majority by achieving 24.86% of the vote, which allotted them 24 of the 74 seats in
parliament (European Parliament, 2014).
These electoral gains demonstrate how during periods of economic instability, the
political rhetoric of neo-nationalist parties tends to have a greater appeal to voters. The FN’s
economic agenda promotes economic “patriotism” and national preference, demonstrated
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through proposals to implement high taxes on companies that manufacture their products
outside of France or to revert back to using the Franc (“Le programme de Marine Le Pen”,
2012). France’s period of economic turmoil creates an appealing climate for the economic
platform of the FN, as French people experiencing the consequences of economic instability
are going to respond more positively to this platform since they are fearful for their livelihoods
and wellbeing.
Moreover, this correlation between electoral gains for the FN and the poor economic
state in France becomes even more evident when comparing voting trends and unemployment
in various regions of France. In 2012, unemployment rates were the lowest towards the
North, as seen in Somme Aisne (department 2; 13.83%) and Pas-de-Calais (department 62;
12.79%), and towards the South of France, in Pyrénées-Orientales (department 66; 13.67%) and
Hérault (department 34; 13.77%) (Actualix, 2012). Based on the FN’s regional results in the
2012 presidential election, the party appears to have higher electoral success in departments
towards the North and South of France, mirroring the regions with high unemployment
rates. Several departments that had some of the highest unemployment rates in the country,
such as Pas-de-Calais (department 62; 25.53%), Aisne (department 2; 26.33%), and Vaucluse
(department 84; 27.03%), also appear to have voted the most for the FN (Norsk Senter for
Forskningdata, n.d.) Therefore, these numbers suggest that regions of high unemployment
tend to be significant electoral bases for the FN.
The FN tends to gain votes in regions plagued by unemployment and economic
turmoil. Departments in the North and South were hit the hardest by the 2008 economic
crisis, predisposing these regions to economic hardship. As a result of their status as centers
of industrialized economic activity in decline, these regions had higher unemployment
rates and lower wages compared to other regions in France. However, the recession caused
unemployment in these areas to rapidly increase while economic productivity quickly
declined. France’s economic crisis became particularly visible within these areas, heightening
fears within the region. Likewise, lingering economic instability, as well as the French
government’s inability to alleviate the situation, not only intensified economic insecurities
in the region, but also made people fearful of globalization and neo-liberalism. The fear
and insecurities sparked by the 2008 economic crisis have boosted the appeal of the FN’s
protectionist and exclusionary platform.

Social: Changing Immigration Trends
The FN is arguably the most well-known for its anti-immigration stance that has been
central to its ideology since its founding. When the FN made its first significant electoral gains
in the 1980s, immigration trends in France were changing, as more people from non-European
countries were moving to France. As immigration from outside Europe continues to steadily
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increase in the 21st century, so have the public’s fears about the impact of immigration on
French society. The combination of these trends reinforces the FN’s message that immigration
is something to be feared.
During World War II and its immediate aftermath, Europeans were the dominant
group immigrating to France. In 1946, immigrants from North Africa made up 2.3% of the
total foreign population, while European immigrants accounted for 88.7% (Stockemer, 2017).
However, for the rest of the 20th century the percentage of European immigrants moving to
France continued to drop. By 1982, the percentage of European immigrants in France’s foreign
population reduced to 56%, whereas the percentage of African immigrants increased to 34%
(Barou, 2014). Furthermore, European immigration has continued to decrease while African
immigration continued to rapidly increase. According to the most recent data on immigration
trends published in 2014, immigrants made up 9.1% of the total French population (National
Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, 2018). Within this percentage, European
immigrants made up 36.1% of the foreign population in France, while African immigrants
made up 43.8% (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, 2018).
Increased visibility of non-European immigrants within France has shifted the public’s
perspective on immigration, specifically heightening concerns regarding the increase in
immigrants from predominately Muslim countries. Immigration trends, like those France
has experienced, are “one of the most common constructed threats to societal security . . .
which is viewed as something that can change the receiving society’s identity by shifting
the composition of the population” (Alkopher, 2015, p. 431). A study by the Ifo Institute
that analyzed how immigration impacts voting for far-right and far-left parties in France
found that immigration increases support for far-right candidates, with little to no impact
on voting for far-left candidates (Edo, Giesing, Öztunc, & Poutvaara, 2017). According to
this study, “looking at different immigrant groups shows that the increase in the electoral
support for the far-right is driven by [the presence of] low educated immigrants from nonWestern countries” (Edo et al., 2017, p. 27). These researchers determined that heightened
negative attitudes towards immigration are largely a result of concerns over “compositional
amenities”, or concerns regarding population composition of the receiving country in regards
to characteristics like religion, race, ethnicity, and culture (Edo et al., 2017).
Surveys over the past three years in France echo the findings of the Ifo Institute’s study,
indicating that the French public has a more negative attitude regarding immigration. The 2016
Eurobarometer, which measures public opinion in EU member states about various topics,
shows that the two main concerns of the French are immigration and terrorism (European
Commission, 2016). The 2017 Special Eurobarometer reports that there is a disconnect between
the French public’s perception of the size of the immigrant population and its actual size.
In this report, about 21% of the French public estimated that immigrants made up between
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12% and 25% of the total population in France (European Commission, 2017). The average
respondent estimated that the proportion of immigrants in the country was at 18.1%, while
in actuality immigrants only comprised 9.1% of the total population (European Commission,
2017). Additionally, this survey showed that 38% of the French population sees immigration
from outside the EU as a problem for France rather than an opportunity, while only 17%
believed the opposite (European Commission, 2017). Lastly, a survey conducted by the
Institute of International Affairs at the Chatham House did a poll in 2017 asking 10,000 people
from 10 different European countries if “all migration from mainly Muslim countries should
be stopped” (Chatham House, 2017). In this survey, about 61% of French people surveyed
agreed that immigration from Muslim countries should be stopped, whereas only 16%
disagreed with this statement (Chatham House, 2017). This data indicates that a significant
portion of the French population sees rising immigration rates and the increasing presence
of non-European, Muslim immigrants as a threat to the compositional “well-being” of the
country.
Increasing immigration and heightened anti-immigration sentiments in France have
benefitted the FN by strengthening the appeal of their anti-immigration message. This
development becomes significantly more evident when comparing the geographic location
of immigrants in France with the regions where the FN performs well in elections. A study
conducted by Daniel Della Posa discovered a strong regional connection between immigration
size and voter support for the FN. Della Posa’s research determined that immigrant
population size has a positive relationship with FN support on a department level and a
negative relationship on a commune level (Della Posa, 2013). However, Della Posa concludes
that “department etranger population’s positive association with [FN] voting is considerably
stronger in magnitude than commune etranger population’s counteracting negative
association” (Della Posa, 2013, pp. 269-270). Thus, in other words, the FN-suppressing effects
of the commune electorate have not been strong enough to negate the party’s positive electoral
effects on the regional level.
Della Posa’s finding that large immigrant populations positively impact regional
electoral support for the FN is exemplified by the party’s electoral success in Southern France,
where immigration appears to be the highest outside of Paris. In a poll conducted by Le
Monde in 2013, 97% of voters from Southern France emphasized that “there are too many
immigrants in France,” and 85% of them stated, “I no longer feel safe” (Mestre, 2013). As
non-European immigration has become more visible within southern regions, many voters
perceive it as a threat. In return this fear has made reactionary anti-immigration attitudes and
the rhetoric of the FN more appealing, creating a strong regional voter base for the party.
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Political: The Sarkozy and Hollande Presidencies
The Sarkozy Administration (2007-2012)
Nicolas Sarkozy played an important role in integrating the FN ideology into
mainstream politics in two notable ways. First, Sarkozy largely legitimized and normalized
the FN’s platform. Throughout his 2007 and 2012 presidential campaigns, Sarkozy capitalized
on the rhetoric of the FN in order to attract the support of Marine Le Pen’s electorate. While
he is not the first mainstream politician to embrace the FN’s neo-nationalist discourse in order
to win an election, Sarkozy is seen as a central figure for the legitimization of the party’s ideas
since no other politicians had made use of this rhetoric “in such a persistent and open manner
[as he has]” (Mondon, 2013, p. 29).
Sarkozy’s role is most evident in his appropriation of the FN’s populist, exclusionary,
and fear-based language. During his 2007 presidential campaign, Sarkozy claimed that
France was experiencing a crisis of national identity. He argued, “our republican model is in
crisis. This crisis is first and foremost a moral crisis. . . a crisis of values, a crisis of landmarks,
a crisis of meaning, a crisis of identity. The denigration of the nation is at the heart of this
crisis” (Mondon, 2013, p. 33). Sarkozy claimed that people had stopped being proud of their
“Frenchness” and that if he was elected, he would revitalize the French identity (Mondon,
2014). However, in doing so, Sarkozy was not attempting to address systemic failures or
problems within the French state (Mondon, 2013). Rather, he was fostering fear and promoting
the FN’s exclusionary conception of French identity in which those who were “deviant” from
traditional French culture became the “Other” and were portrayed as responsible for this
crisis. Consequently, Sarkozy fabricated connections between immigration and this identity
crisis, as well as immigration and security.
In order to avoid being labeled as racist, Sarkozy’s rhetoric promoted a dichotomy
that shifted the focus from heredity to integration. Consequently, this divided immigrants
into two groups: immigrants who came legally and assimilated into French society, thus
deserving to be French, and immigrants who had come illegally and/or appeared to be holding
on to their original culture, therefore undeserving of becoming French (Mondon, 2013). This
second group, often depicted as the Muslim community, was seen as a threat to the economic
well-being of France through accusations this group was taking advantage of France by
stealing social services, jobs, housing, and money that rightfully belonged to French citizens.
Additionally, the portrayed incompatibility of these immigrants with French values was
perceived as a threat to the preservation and longevity of French culture.
After Sarkozy entered office in 2007, his rhetoric and actions continued to match the
discourse of the FN. He restricted immigration laws and significantly reduced the rights of
immigrants, arguing that in doing so it would improve the state of France (Gastaut, 2012).
Moreover, he continued to use these populations as scapegoats and specifically targeted
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the Muslim community. In 2009, Sarkozy declared that “the burqa is not welcome on the
Republic’s territory. It does not fit with the Republican concept of the dignity of women”
(Gastaut, 2012, p. 339). Subsequently, in 2010 the Loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans
l’espace public (the law prohibiting concealment of the face in public space) was passed in the
Senate. This law prohibited women from wearing veils and attire that covered the face in
public, such as the burqa and niqab, and was largely seen as a tool to specifically discriminate
against Muslims (Gastaut, 2012). Sarkozy’s targeted discrimination continued in 2011 after
he outlawed street prayers, an idea originally devised by Marine Le Pen (Vinocur, 2011). This
was a clear, strategic attempt by Sarkozy to attract the FN’s electorate to his side for the 2012
presidential election, similar to his strategy from the 2007 election. Moreover, in an interview
in 2012, Sarkozy solidified the FN’s normalization even further, stating that Marine Le Pen’s
FN was a “democratic party” and their values were “in accordance with the values of the
Republic” (Mondon 2014, p. 311). However, by the election in 2012, Sarkozy’s use of the FN’s
rhetoric altered how people perceived Le Pen and her party, making the FN’s rhetoric and
platform “widely accepted as part of the political establishment, clear of stigma” (Mondon,
2013, p. 38).
Sarkozy’s other main contribution to the rise of the FN is that his presidency furthered
the French public’s distrust for the traditional political parties. Sarkozy’s approval rating
during his presidency is indicative of the French public’s lack of trust in his leadership.
Although his popularity peaked at the beginning of his presidency with an approval rating of
65% in July 2007, a year later the public’s support of Sarkozy drastically changed (Kantar TNS,
2012). In July 2008, only 33% of the French population expressed confidence in Sarkozy, while
65% expressed having no confidence (Kantar TNS, 2012). His presidency revealed that there
were inconsistencies between his campaign platform and the actions he took in office. During
his campaign, Sarkozy vowed to transform France in a way that would benefit the poor, those
who felt scorned by globalization, and those who felt neglected by the traditional French
parties. Yet, during his presidency there was little to no economic growth, tax reforms only
benefitting the elite were introduced, unemployment skyrocketed, and France lost its AAA
credit rating (Erlanger, 2012; Chrisafis, 2012). Those he initially claimed to represent ended up
in worse standing following his time in office. Even with the impacts of the global economic
crisis, it was clear that Sarkozy’s actions fell short of his campaign promises (Gastaut, 2012).
Sarkozy’s emphasis on security, immigration, and identity generated more fear in France, but
his policies did not ameliorate the condition of the French state. The public’s dissatisfaction
with Sarkozy undoubtedly unfolded as dissatisfaction and distrust for his party, the Union
pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP). Between 2008-2011, the UMP experienced several electoral
defeats, greatly weakening their influence in the French government, eventually resulting in
UMP candidates distancing themselves from the President to salvage their political reputation

109

(Knapp, 2013). By the end of his presidency, 60% of the public expressed dissatisfaction with
Sarkozy (Kantar TNS, 2012).
The unpopularity of and division within the UMP largely favored the FN in two
significant ways. First, electoral defeat and internal turmoil, partly due to dissatisfaction
with Sarkozy, resulted in the UMP dissolving in 2015. Following Sarkozy’s loss in the 2012
presidential election, his reputation was severely smeared and his party had lost its electorate.
As the UMP had been a significant competitor for the FN in elections, its fall aided the neonationalist party by making it the central contender for the right-wing electorate (Mondon,
2013). Second, the UMP’s unpopularity augmented anti-establishment sentiments and
distrust of traditional right-wing parties. Sarkozy’s presidency communicated to the public
that mainstream right-wing parties, such as the UMP, were unable to effectively address the
problems plaguing France because they were part of the problem. This furthered the appeal of
the FN as the alternative party France needed in order to be “restored”.
The Hollande Administration (2012-2017)
In response to Sarkozy’s presidency, the French public gravitated to the other side of
the political spectrum, electing Parti Socialist (PS) François Hollande in 2012. Since Sarkozy’s
presidency communicated to the public that traditional right parties were unable to address
the problems facing the French, the public elected Hollande with the hopes that the traditional
left would be able to do what the right could not.
Although shortly after taking office Hollande had an approval rating of 61%, by the end
of 2012 his rating drastically changed (Kuhn, 2014). For the rest of his presidency, Hollande
had particularly low approval ratings, remaining below 30% from 2013 to mid-2015 (Kantar
TNS, 2017). His ratings only improved following a terrorist attack in Paris in November 2015.
However, by February 2016 his ratings had dropped again, with only 15% of the French public
expressing confidence in Hollande (Kantar TNS, 2017).
Hollande’s unpopularity is attributed to his inability to uphold his campaign promises,
specifically those regarding unemployment and economic growth. When Hollande came into
office, the French economy was still experiencing the consequences of the global economic
crisis, with the unemployment rate at 9.7% and rising public debt (Kuhn, 2014). As a result
of this economic context, Hollande was unable to reduce the unemployment rate. Due to an
insufficient level of economic growth throughout his time in office, Hollande’s policy measures
aimed at reducing unemployment proved unsuccessful (Kuhn, 2014). The unemployment rate
continued to skyrocket throughout the course of his presidency, peaking in 2015 at 10.39%
(World Bank, 2018). Thus, the economy of France continued to remain in crisis, making
Hollande appear ineffective and useless.
The populations hit the hardest by this economic instability were those with low
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education levels and skills, specifically those working manufacturing jobs, which historically
had been the main electorate of the PS (Kuhn, 2014). Therefore, as a result of Hollande’s
presidency, people lost trust in the left. This loss of support is exemplified by the PS
performance in the 2017 presidential election. Not only was the PS candidate, Benoît Hamon,
unable to make it to the second round of voting, but he placed 5th in the first round of voting,
receiving both the lowest rank and number of votes a PS candidate has ever received in a
presidential election (Bonnefous & Chapuis, 2017). Betrayed by Sarkozy (UMP) and then
Hollande (PS), it became clear to the public that these traditional parties were no longer able
to address the needs and concerns of the French people. This belief ultimately strengthened
the appeal of the FN as an alternative party, neither for the left nor the right, but rather for the
French.

Discussion and Analysis of Interactions
Separately, the economic recession of 2008, changing immigration trends, and the
presidencies of Sarkozy and Hollande benefited the FN, as each presented an economic,
social, and political justification for supporting the party. However, examining how these
transformations interacted and intersected with one another provides a more holistic
understanding of how these changes strengthened the rise of the FN.
The economic recession of 2008 strengthened the appeal of the FN’s protectionist
approach, particularly in regions with high unemployment and low economic growth.
Rising immigration rates and the increasing presence of non-European, Muslim immigrants
complemented this protectionist stance because it reinforced the FN’s claim that there is a
connection between immigration and unemployment. Sarkozy, through his appropriation of
the FN’s rhetoric, asserted that there was an additional relationship between immigration,
security, and national identity, thus normalizing the FN’s ideology. Moreover, the economic
recession of 2008 and its lasting grip on the French economy greatly contributed to the public’s
dissatisfaction with both Sarkozy and Hollande, indirectly strengthening anti-establishment
sentiments and reinforcing the appeal of the FN as an alternative political party.
Above all else, these factors demonstrate how the FN benefits from crisis and fear.
The rhetoric surrounding these transformations communicates to the French public that their
country is in a state of crisis— an economic crisis, an identity crisis, and a political crisis. The
FN’s platform underscores this message, promoting the idea that the French state has been
weakened by the globalized world and the missteps of past presidential administrations.
Moreover, these crises translate into multiple fears contributing to the FN’s permanence: the
fear of another global recession, the fear French culture is being threatened by the presence
of “incompatible” cultures and religions, and the fear the French government is ineffective

111

and unable to address these crises. The FN has built its image around the prioritization of
the French people, capitalizing on the notion that when people are afraid for their safety
and wellbeing they will be drawn to what they believe will protect them. The FN thrives
during times of heightened instability because the fear of difference is the basis of their
ideology. This is exemplified by the FN’s tendency to win the most votes in regions with
high unemployment, low economic growth, and large immigrant populations, as these are
areas where the “crises” are the most visible. In part, this is what distinguishes the FN from
other extremist groups— the Front National is strategic and adaptive during times of crisis.
Therefore, when chaos ensues within French society, the party is at its strongest.

Conclusion
Many assumed that Macron’s victory in the 2017 election symbolized the end of the FN.
His victory represented France’s willingness to try a different approach rather than accepting
the exclusionary neo-nationalist platform of the FN as an alternative to traditional political
parties. However, Le Pen’s loss did not mean that the FN was finished in French politics, nor
did it symbolize a much larger rejection of neo-nationalism around the world. During this
election, Le Pen won a historical amount of votes for her party.
This paper identified how the 2008-2009 global economic crisis, shifting immigration
trends, and the presidencies of Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande have interacted with
one another to strengthen the rise of the Front National. Ultimately, these transformations
collectively support the notion that France is in a state of crisis, requiring an alternative party
to take power, therefore bolstering the appeal of the FN. However, there are several other
transformations that have contributed to the success of FN that have not been covered in this
paper, such as how French politicians aside from Sarkozy and Hollande have normalized and
legitimized the values of the party or the way la laïcité is implemented in France.16Additionally,
the analysis and understanding of how these transformations interact are limited in this paper.
However, this analysis is not meant to provide a relatively simple explanation for a very
complex situation. Rather, it is meant to contribute to a general gap in research and serve as a
starting point from which other researchers may build.
Arguably now more than ever it is important to understand the source of the FN’s
support, as it provides powerful insights about other neo-nationalists parties. Since 2017, other
neo-nationalist politicians have made instrumental gains in their own countries, such as Jair
Bolsonaro’s victory in the 2018 Brazilian presidential election or Matteo Salvini’s terms as
the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior of Italy. In the recent 2019 European
Parliament elections, neo-nationalist parties made headlines not only because there was a
historic number of these parties participating, but also because of their electoral results. Several
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of these parties won majorities within their respective countries, such as the Front National,
the League (Italy), the Freedom Party (Austria), the Swedish Democrats (Sweden), the
National Alliance (Latvia), the Alternative for Germany, and several others (Damgé & Breteau,
2019).17 Moreover, understanding where the power and support of the FN comes from is also
important for understanding the future of France. Since his inauguration in 2017, Macron and
his policies have remained particularly unpopular, recently indicated by the mouvement des
gilets jaunes (“yellow vests movement”), which calls for his resignation among other demands.
The general dissatisfaction in France regarding Macron, among people who did not vote for
him as well as those who did, could mean that Le Pen and her party will be seen as the best
option for the upcoming French presidential election in 2022.
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Notes
Following this election, France reverted back to a plurality voting system for legislative
elections.
1

In the first round, Le Pen won 16.86% of votes, taking second place and beating the PS
candidate Lionel Jospin (Norsk Senter for Forskningdata, n.d.). In the second round of voting,
the Le Pen was able to attain 17.8% of the votes, resulting in his opponent Jacques Chirac
becoming the next president of France (Norsk Senter for Forskningdata, n.d.).
2

3

Beginning between the first and second rounds of voting.

For example, under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the FN proposed that France halt all
immigration to France. Since Marine Le Pen took over, the party now calls for the number of
immigrants France accepts to be reduced to 10,000.
4

This paper makes the strategic choice to continue to refer to the party as le Front National.
In doing so, this paper asserts that the “new” party of Marine Le Pen and the “old” party
of Jean-Marie Le Pen are essentially the same and seeks to ensure that this rebranding does
dissimulate the racist and xenophobic ideology and history of the party.
5

In the departmental elections of 2011, the FN won 15.06% of the vote whereas in 2008 the
party only won 4.85% (Funke, Schularick, & Trebesch, 2015). In the legislative elections of 2012,
the FN won 13.60%, when in 2007 the party won 4.29% (Funke, Schularick, & Trebesch, 2015).
6

In 2012, Marine Le Pen won 17.90% (6,421,426 votes) in the first round, while in 2007 her
father only acquired 10.44% (3,834,713 votes) (Norsk Senter for Forskningdata, n.d.).
7

117

For example, the FN proposes a drastic cut to the number of immigrants France accepts
each year, from 200,000 to 10,000; employers, housing, and social welfare programs should
prioritize French people; that le droit du sol be replaced with the droit du sang; that if an
immigrant enters France undocumented for any reason they shall be deported with no
exceptions; that demonstrations showing support for undocumented immigrants should be
made illegal (“Le programme de Marine Le Pen”, 2012).
8

9

i.e. Town or city.

10

i.e. State or regional.

11

Original: “il y a trop d’immigrés en France.»

12

Original: “je ne me sens plus en sécurité.”

Only 34% of the French population expressed dissatisfaction with Sarkozy (Kantar TNS,
2012).
13

14

Sarkozy’s approval rating was at 37% (Kantar TNS, 2012).

15

His approval rating improved to 35% (Kantar TNS, 2012).

16

In simple terms, la laïcité is the French conception of secularism.

The FN won 23.3% of votes, the League won 34.3%, the Freedom Party won 17.2%, the
Swedish Democrats won 15.4%, the National Alliance won 16.4%, and the Alternative for
Germany won 11%.
17
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